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Abstract 
 
We argue that even in perfectly frictionless markets risk aversion driven by exchange rate 
uncertainty may cause a wedge between the domestic and foreign price of a totally 
homogeneous good. We test our hypothesis using a natural experiment based on a unique 
micro-data set from a market with minimum imperfections. The empirical findings validate 
our hypothesis, as accounting for exchange rate uncertainty we are able to explain a 
substantial proportion of deviations from the law of one price. Overall, our analysis suggests 
the possibility of a new solution to the purchasing power parity puzzles.  
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1. Introduction  
Despite their widespread adoption by theoretical models of international 
macroeconomics and finance, a large empirical literature in the 1970s and 1980s rejected the 
law of one price (LOOP) and its generalisation, purchasing power parity (PPP) as equilibrium 
conditions among industrialised countries for the period of floating exchange rates (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000, Taylor, 1995). Failure of long-run PPP is described in the literature as the 
first PPP puzzle (Taylor et al, 2001). Furthermore, even when long-run PPP is validated, the 
half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate is estimated between three to five years, too high 
to be explained by conventional arguments such as nominal rigidities. This gives rise to a 
second PPP puzzle, summarised by Rogoff (1996, p. 647) as follows: “How can one 
reconcile the enormous short-run volatility of real exchange rates with the extremely slow 
rate at which shocks [away from PPP] appear to damp out ?” 
Existing explanations of the PPP puzzles in the context of industrialised countries 
focus on market imperfections. We offer a new explanation based on exchange rate 
uncertainty and risk aversion. We argue that even under perfectly frictionless markets, risk-
averse consumers facing exchange rate uncertainty and having no access to hedging 
instruments are willing to pay the domestic importer of a foreign good a risk premium over 
the good’s foreign price. They do so in order to fix the cash outflow from the good’s purchase 
when measured in units of domestic currency. This drives a permanent wedge between 
domestic and foreign prices explaining violations of the LOOP even under frictionless 
markets. Moreover, a persistent increase in uncertainty about future exchange rates results in 
persistent deviations of the good’s domestic price from its foreign one.  
We test our hypothesis on a unique micro-data set from a market with minimum 
imperfections, namely the market for online air-travel tickets. This provides a natural 
experiment from which the factors previously identified as the main causes of deviations 
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from the LOOP are excluded. The empirical findings validate our hypothesis as accounting 
for exchange rate uncertainty we are able to explain a substantial proportion of deviations 
from the LOOP. Our analysis is too simple to be considered as an integrated theory of price 
setting under alternative exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, our natural experiment 
provides a powerful test of our hypothesis and suggests that co-existence of enormous 
exchange rate volatility and persistent deviations from the LOOP and PPP may not, after all, 
be as puzzling as suggested by Rogoff. Indeed, persistent deviations from PPP may be 
exactly due to enormous exchange rate volatility! 
 
2. Previous literature and motivation 
2.1. Existing solutions to the PPP puzzles  
Existing solutions to the first PPP puzzle (empirical failure of long-run PPP) mainly 
fall into two categories, giving rise to two literature strands. The first consists of econometric 
explanations, mainly focusing on the low power of the linear time-series techniques used to 
test PPP.
1
 This strand essentially treats the empirical rejection of long-run PPP as a statistical 
illusion and aims to develop PPP tests of higher power. In this context a number of studies 
use long-span samples and panel-data techniques reaching findings more favourable towards 
PPP (see Sarno, 2005). These, however, have not escaped econometric critiques themselves
2
 
and have mainly validated PPP in its relative rather than absolute version. Therefore, they 
largely leave unexplained differences among national price levels when measured in terms of 
a common currency.
 3
 
                                                 
1
 The failure of standard linear unit root test to capture mean-reverting behaviour in the movements of real 
exchange rates is also related to the possibility of nonlinear adjustment towards PPP (see below).  
2
 Long-span studies mix periods from fixed and flexible exchange rates, which may affect the statistical 
properties of the tests employed. On the other hand, most panel-data studies impose the null hypothesis that all 
exchange rates included in the panel are not consistent with PPP. This results in a high probability of rejecting 
the null even when only one of the panel’s series is consistent with PPP. For further discussion see Sarno and 
Taylor (2002), chapter 3.  
3
 Another econometric explanation for the empirical failure of long-run PPP has been offered by Taylor (2001) 
and is based on temporal data aggregation. Taylor shows that a real exchange rate following an AR(1) process at 
 3 
The second strand treats PPP’s long-run failure as a real phenomenon and develops 
theoretical arguments to explain it. One group of explanations includes shifts in relative 
demand (e.g. changes in consumers’ preferences
4
 or fiscal shocks
5
) and relative productivity, 
as originally suggested by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
6
 Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that demand shocks explain PPP violations to a modest degree only. On 
the other hand, the Balassa-Samuelson model has been reasonably successful in explaining 
PPP violations between developed and developing countries.
7
 By contrast, with the exception 
of the Japanese Yen, it has been much less so in the context of industrialised countries (see 
Rogoff, 1996). Another group of explanations attributes PPP’s failure to deviations from the 
latter’s founding cornerstone, the LOOP. Indeed, numerous empirical studies
8
 have 
documented what Engel and Rogers (1996) define as a “border effect” where domestic price 
differentials, even for highly differentiated goods are smaller, less volatile and less persistent 
than cross-border price differentials among homogeneous goods.
9
 As the LOOP assumes 
totally frictionless markets, its failure is typically attributed to market imperfections among 
which transport costs, tariffs and other trade barriers are the predominant (though not 
exclusive) examples.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a higher frequency than the one at which the data is sampled results in an upward bias in the estimated speed of 
adjustment towards PPP. 
4
 A related explanation is the existence of a consumers’ bias in favour of domestic goods. Typically this is 
assumed but not derived (see e.g. Benigno and Thoenissen, 2003). Our analysis below provides an explanation 
for the existence of such a home bias.  
5
 See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995).  
6
 Portfolio balance models (see e.g. Branson, 1983) explain permanent deviations from PPP as the result of 
accumulated current account imbalances. However, as Rogoff (1996) argues, the empirical validity of this effect 
is debatable; and even if it exists the causation pattern is unclear, as virtually any kind of correlation between the 
current account and the real exchange rate can be easily rationalised.  
7
 A similar explanation has been offered by Bhagwati (1984) who argued that prices in developed countries are 
higher than in developing ones due to higher wages caused by higher capital to labour ratios.  
8
 See Isard (1977), Richardson (1978), Giovannini (1988), Knetter (1989, 1993), Engel (1993), Engel and 
Rogers (1995) and Parsley and Wei (1996). 
9
 In a recent paper, however, Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) argue that the border effect identified by Engel 
and Rogers (1996) may be overestimated. This is so because in the presence of cross-country heterogeneity in 
the distribution of within-country price differentials there is no clear benchmark allowing the identification of 
the border effect. As a result, empirical estimates of the border effect cannot separate the latter from the effect of 
trading with a country with different internal distribution of prices.  
10
 See Knetter (1994), Feenstra (1995), Rogoff (1996) and Feenstra and Kendall (1997). Alternative 
explanations for LOOP failure due to market frictions include non-traded inputs and non-uniform taxes in the 
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Market imperfections also underlie the existing explanations for the second PPP 
puzzle, i.e. excessive persistence of deviations from PPP. A number of authors
11
 have 
developed theoretical models in which transactions’ and other sunk costs result in nonlinear 
adjustment towards the LOOP and, by extension, PPP: Deviations from the LOOP are non-
mean reverting (or adjusting very slowly) if smaller than arbitrage-trading costs, but fast 
mean-reverting once they exceed the latter. Empirical studies have provided significant 
evidence of such nonlinearities, justifying the previously mentioned failure of linear testing 
techniques to validate long-run PPP.
12
 On the other hand, Imbs et al (2005) show that 
heterogeneous adjustment dynamics to the LOOP across the individual components of a 
basket of goods (caused by varying impediments to arbitrage and nominal rigidities across 
different goods) result in a positive bias in standard panel and time-series estimates of 
persistence of shocks to the aggregate real exchange rate.
 
Correcting for this bias they obtain 
estimates of half-lives of shocks to the latter as low as eleven months. They also show that 
persistent adjustment heterogeneity at the disaggregated level is fully compatible with the 
nonlinear dynamics observed in the movements of aggregate real exchange rates.  
 
2.2. Two unanswered questions and a new hypothesis  
Summarising our discussion above, given the limited evidence in favour of Balassa-
Samuelson effects, market imperfections are the main explanation offered by the existing 
literature for both PPP puzzles in the context of industrialised countries. However, despite its 
sound theoretical foundations and empirical support, this explanation leaves two important 
questions unanswered: 
                                                                                                                                                        
retail prices of heavily-traded goods (see e.g. Parsley and Wei, 2007); less than perfect homogeneity between 
domestic and foreign goods; incomplete exchange rate pass-through due to pricing-to-market strategies (see e.g. 
Krugman 1987, Dixit 1989, Feenstra 1995, Betts and Devereux 2000); and menu/fixed costs faced by 
importers/consumers when changing prices/switching between suppliers (see e.g. Froot and Klemperer 1989, 
Kasa 1992).  
11
 See e.g. Dumas (1992), Sercu et al. (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and O’Connell and Wei (2001).  
12
 Among others see Michael et al. (1997), Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001) and O’Connell and Wei (2001).  
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First, if market imperfections are the main reason for PPP’s failure among 
industrialised countries, why do empirical studies consistently validate PPP as a long-run 
equilibrium condition for these countries over periods of fixed exchange rates?
13
 Surely, 
imperfections such as transportation costs and trade barriers also existed prior to the mid-
1970s; if anything they were even more pronounced than they have been in recent years.  
Second, given that PPP is generally rejected among industrialised countries for the 
period of flexible exchange rates, why is it over the same period validated among countries 
implementing bilateral fixed exchange rate regimes such as those within the European 
Monetary System (EMS)?
14
 True, geographical proximity among EMS countries reduces 
transactions costs, thereby increasing the probability of validating the LOOP and PPP. 
Geographical proximity, however, also exists between the USA and Canada, for which Engel 
and Rogers (1996) found overwhelming evidence of the border effect discussed above.  
These questions raise an intriguing possibility: Is it likely that deviations from the 
PPP and its founding cornerstone, the LOOP, are linked to nominal exchange rate variability 
and, if yes, why? Section 3 below uses a simple example to formulate and rationalise this 
hypothesis.
15
  
 
3. A simple demand-side example 
In this section we provide a simple example where exchange rate uncertainty coupled 
with risk-aversion induces a violation of the LOOP even under zero transportation and 
transaction costs. Consider a representative risk-averse agent who plans to purchase good X, 
produced in a foreign country. The agent can buy good X either from a domestic supplier 
                                                 
13
 Among others see Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Gaillot (1970) and Taylor and McMahon (1988). See also 
Sarno (2005) and the references therein.  
14
 See Kugler and Lenz (1993), Chowdhury and Sdogati (1993) and Cheung et al. (2005).  
15
 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) show that equilibrium exchange rates may be affected by a time-varying risk 
premium term. This insight, however, has not been used to explain deviations from the LOOP and PPP (indeed 
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model assumes that the LOOP and PPP hold). Our analysis below uses a simple demand-
side example to explain deviations from PPP on exchange uncertainty.  
 6 
(importer) or directly from its foreign producer. Both markets, domestic and foreign, are 
totally frictionless (zero transportation and other transactions costs). We assume zero trade 
barriers and, in line with the redux model by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), producer-currency-
pricing whereby firms set exports’ prices in terms of their local currency. In that case, the 
domestic price of foreign products is a one-to-one function of the nominal exchange rate.
16
  
If the agent purchases X from the domestic importer her net wealth, after the purchase, 
will be known with certainty. If, on the other hand, she purchases X directly from the foreign 
supplier her net wealth following the purchase will be subject to some degree of uncertainty. 
The latter is due to the fact that although the purchase order is given at current time t, the 
transaction will be cleared at a future date where the exchange rate is not known with 
certainty.
17
 In this framework we assume that there are no hedging instruments available for 
the purchase. Let the time interval between the time the agent makes the purchase and the 
time the transaction is cleared be denoted by d. In addition, let the time-t nominal wealth of 
the agent and nominal exchange rate (defined as domestic currency units per unit of foreign 
currency) be denoted by tW and tS  respectively. Note that contrary to tW , which is assumed 
to remain unchanged over the time interval d, tS  exhibits a high frequency variation. Let the 
price of X in the domestic and foreign markets be denoted by tP  and 
f
tP respectively. 
Consequently, if the agent buys X from the domestic market, in the absence of other 
purchases, her net wealth at time t+d, per unit of the local price, will be ( ) tttl dt PPWW /−=+ . 
                                                 
16
 There exists a rich literature on the determinants and effects of the currency of invoicing of international trade 
(see, among others, Corsetti and Pesenti 2005 and Goldberg and Tille, 2008). A number of authors substitute the 
producer-currency-pricing assumption adopted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998) with pricing-to-market or 
dollar-pricing assumptions to explain, among others, deviations from the LOOP and PPP as well as international 
transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Our analysis below explains deviations from the LOOP and PPP 
maintaining the producer-currency-pricing assumption of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) baseline redux model.  
17
 For example, consider the market for electronic air-travel tickets sold online. The agent who purchases an air-
ticket from a foreign website does not know with absolute certainty the exchange rate applying to her 
transaction at the time the foreign company charges her credit card. This market will be analyzed further in the 
following section. 
 7 
If she buys X from the foreign market her net wealth, per unit of the local price, will be 
( ) tftdttf dt PPSWW /++ −= .  
Given the assumptions above, when the domestic agent chooses to buy the good from 
the foreign supplier she does not know her net wealth in time t+d because she does not know 
with certainty what dtS +  will be. Nevertheless, she has expectations for dtS +  conditional on 
her time-t information set. We assume that the growth rate of the exchange rate is random, 
that is dttdt KSS ++ =/  with 1=+dttKE  and 1
22 +=+ tdttKE σ , where tE  denotes the time-t 
expectation operator. Moreover, we assume that the risk-averse agent has a utility function 
( )XWu i ,*  for i=l,f, where ( )=XWu i ,* ( ) ( )XuWu i β+  with 0>β . Nevertheless, since the 
agent will buy the good in either case, the second term of the utility function is a constant and 
thus it is excluded from our subsequent analysis. Function ( )iWu  is continuously 
differentiable, increasing with wealth and strictly concave (i.e. ( ) 0' >iWu  and ( ) 0'' <iWu ). 
As we explain below, the risk-averse domestic agent may be willing to pay an exchange-rate-
induced risk premium, π, to buy good X from the domestic market. On the other hand, a 
foreign agent will never be willing to pay a foreign exchange risk premium to buy a good 
produced in her own country, as the good is already priced in terms of her own (i.e. foreign) 
currency.  In other words, 
18
 
                                           0≥
−
=
t
f
ttt
t
P
PSP
π                                                           (1) 
The good is imported to the domestic market only if ( ) ( )l dtf dtt WuWuE ++ ≤ , otherwise 
domestic consumers will buy the good directly from foreign producers. If this condition holds 
with strict inequality however, the domestic importer will keep increasing the domestic price, 
                                                 
18
 Equivalently, 
( )
0
/1
≤
−
=
f
t
tt
f
tf
t
P
PSP
π . 
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since domestic consumers will be willing to pay more for the good, in order to exploit the 
profit margin available. Thus, in equilibrium, the domestic agent will be indifferent between 
buying X from the domestic importer or the foreign supplier:  
                                                 ( ) ( )l dtf dtt WuWuE ++ =                                                             (2) 
Given equation (2), it is straightforward to show, by Jensen's inequality, that the risk-
averse domestic agent is willing to pay a strictly positive risk-premium per unit of the local 
price, i.e. 0>tπ .
19
 Consequently, even under zero transaction and transportation costs if the 
agent is risk-averse and next period’s exchange rate is uncertain the LOOP will not hold.
20
 
Figure 1 provides a simple diagrammatical illustration. Suppose the exchange rate in 
period t+d can take only two values, a “low” exchange rate 1S  with probability α  and a 
“high” exchange rate 12 SS >  with probability ( )α−1 . Then, ( ) ( ) 21 1 f dtf dtf dtt WWWE +++ −+= αα  
and ( )=+f dtt WuE  ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 f dtf dt WuWu ++ −+ αα . As shown in Figure 1 the concavity of u signifies 
that under condition (2) the domestic price Pt incorporates a strictly positive risk premium π. 
Notice that if the agent is risk-averse, the higher the uncertainty about the exchange rate at 
time t+d, the higher the risk-premium  the agent will be willing to pay.21 For example, if the 
value of the “low” exchange rate decreases to S
2′
<S
2
, for a given invariant probability 
distribution for the exchange-rate, the risk premium increases to π ′> π. 
We may express the risk premium as a function of utility and exchange rate volatility 
by taking a Taylor expansion of condition (2). Approximating the latter around 
                                                 
19
 Since u is concave, ( ) ( )f dttf dtt WEuWuE ++ < , by Jensen's inequality. Condition (2) implies that 
( ) ( )f dttl dt WEuWu ++ < . Since u is increasing with iW  it follows that 
( ) ( ) tftttf dttttt PPSWWEPPW // −=<− + . The latter can be rewritten as  ( ) 0/ >=− ttfttt PPSP π  
20
 If the agent is risk neutral the LOOP holds. This is so because risk neutrality implies that ( )•u  is linear. Then, 
condition (2) reduces to ( ) ( ) ttttfttt PPWPPSW // −=−  or 1/ =tftt PPS   
21
 In addition, the higher the curvature of u (i.e. the higher the degree of risk aversion), the higher the value of π. 
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( ) tftttft PPSWW /−=  and assuming that third and higher order terms are negligible and 
02 ≈tπ  we obtain: 
                                               ( ) 2
2
2
1
t
t
f
ttf
tt
P
PS
Wr σπ 





≈                                                     (3) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'/'' >−= ftftft WuWuWr  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  
Rearranging (3) we obtain  
                                                ( ) 2
2
2
1
1 t
t
f
ttf
t
t
f
tt
P
PS
Wr
P
PS
σ





−≈                                              (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) confirm that as long as the agent is risk-averse, (i.e. r(W
f
t)>0) 
non-zero exchange rate uncertainty (σ2t >0) causes a strictly positive risk premium (πt>0) 
resulting in permanent deviations from the LOOP, even in the absence of market 
imperfections. This is an argument explaining the first PPP puzzle (long-run failure of PPP). 
The risk premium πt is a positive function of the degree of absolute risk aversion r(Wft) and 
nominal exchange rate uncertainty σ2t. This implies that the persistence of shocks to πt will 
be closely related to the persistence of the process driving σ2t. Therefore, persistent shocks to 
exchange rate uncertainty could potentially explain the second PPP puzzle, i.e. excessively 
persistent deviations from PPP. Moreover, condition (3) suggests that the risk premium may 
be a non-linear process, which is consistent with the nonlinearities empirically observed in 
deviations from the LOOP (see e.g. Sarno et al, 2004). Finally, equations (3) and (4) imply 
that πt = 0 if 02 =tσ , i.e. under fixed exchange rates the LOOP holds. All in all, conditions 
(3) and (4) provide explanations for both PPP puzzles; capture nonlinear real exchange rate 
dynamics; and are consistent with the full body of empirical evidence, which upholds and 
rejects PPP for periods of fixed and floating exchange rates respectively.  
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4. Modelling deviations from the LOOP in a near-frictionless market 
4.1. Market and data description  
The perfect ground to test whether deviations from the LOOP are explained by 
nominal exchange rate uncertainty would be a perfectly frictionless market where, by virtue 
of their absence, LOOP violations cannot be attributed to the traditional argument of market 
imperfections. Furthermore, the market should be small enough so as its prices not to affect 
aggregate exchange rate developments. A near-frictionless market that meets those 
characteristics is the market for electronic air-travel tickets bought online. We have collected 
daily price quotations provided by the UK and German sites of Expedia and Travelocity for 
an identical London Heathrow (LHR) – New York JFK return e-ticket (economy class) on a 
British Airways (BA) flight departing from LHR four weeks ahead from the date of 
quotation; and returning from JFK five weeks ahead.
22
 Our sample covers the period 1 April 
2006 to 6 March 2009, a total of 1071 daily observations. Prices in the UK and German sites 
are quoted in UK pounds and euros respectively. These include all taxes and booking 
commissions and are net of insurance fees, as the latter is sold separately. As tickets are 
electronic, postage costs are zero; price quotations are freely provided by the websites; and 
the market is constantly open and highly liquid, as the LHR-JFK is the world’s busiest 
intercontinental air route and BA its main operator. Crucially, there are no market-entry 
barriers, as Germany- and UK-based consumers can purchase e-tickets from any website 
using German- or UK-registered debit/credit cards. The only departure from the perfect-
markets’ assumption of section 3 is a foreign exchange conversion fee in the area of 2.5% 
charged by the cards’ issuing banks on foreign purchases. Therefore, the market matches 
almost perfectly the pricing assumptions of our analysis in section 3, as from a domestic 
(German) agent’s point of view the price of the good (ticket) is set by a foreign supplier 
                                                 
22
 At the time of writing British Airways operates eleven daily flights from LHR to JFK. We always collect data 
for the cheapest available trip on the day of quotation. This typically consists of flights BA117 (departing flight) 
and BA178 (returning flight).  
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(British Airways) in terms of foreign currency (sterling pounds), with the agent being able to 
buy the good without restrictions (apart from the conversion fee) either from a domestic 
importer (German website) or from the foreign market (UK website) directly. Overall, the 
market is very close to the full set of assumptions in section 3, thus providing a natural 
experiment from which all factors previously identified as the main potential causes of 
deviations from the LOOP are excluded. As such, it offers a powerful test of our hypothesis 
that exchange rate uncertainty causes deviations from the LOOP.  
Table 1 presents the market’s summary statistics. Starting from intra-domain 
comparisons, on average the LOOP holds between the two UK websites and is reasonably 
close to holding between the German ones. By contrast, inter-domain comparisons reveal 
significant violations of the LOOP, with both German websites being significantly more 
expensive than their UK counterparts by a margin well above the 2.5% difference justified by 
the foreign exchange conversion fee.
23
 Furthermore, inter-domain relative prices are 
significantly more volatile than intra-domain ones, with the coefficient of variation of the 
former being more than double the coefficient of variation of the latter. Overall, despite the 
market’s near-perfect nature, Table 1 provides evidence of the border effect discussed in 
section 2. This, however, cannot be explained by the traditional argument of market 
imperfections.  
Figure 2 presents the inter-domain deviations from the LOOP in logarithmic format. 
This describes the premium (expressed in percentage terms) German consumers pay over the 
                                                 
23
 For inter-domain comparisons we have converted UK prices into euros using the euro/GBP spot exchange 
rate quoted by Thomson Reuters, provided by the Financial Times online currency converter tool at the time of 
the price quotations’ collection. These quotations are freely available and are regularly updated throughout 
business hours, with quotations being delayed by at least ten minutes. As this is a quotation for the mid-point 
exchange rate prevailing at the wholesale currency market, it is certainly lower than the ask exchange rate 
consumers will be charged by the institutions issuing their debit/credit cards. As a result, effective deviations 
from the LOOP are bound to be even more pronounced than those suggested by Table 1. Online facilities 
quoting ask exchange rates charged by financial institutions on credit/debit card transactions with intra-day 
updates are not freely available. This implies that the exchange rate uncertainty faced by consumers buying 
tickets from foreign websites consists of two components. First, uncertainty due to the time difference between 
the ticket’s purchase and the transaction’s electronic clearance. Second, uncertainty due to the difference 
between the publicly quoted mid-exchange rate and the non-publicly available charged ask exchange rate.  
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UK ticket price when the latter is expressed in euros. The premium is defined as 
f
tttt psp −−=ω  where pt, st and 
f
tp respectively denote the logarithm of the price quoted 
by the German web-site in euros, the nominal exchange rate of the euro against the UK 
pound, and the price quoted by the UK web-site in sterling pounds. Deviations from the 
LOOP are highly volatile and include some extreme outliers, for which we account in 
subsequent analysis using intercept dummy variables. Based on our analysis in section 3 we 
expect ωt to be positive, and indeed this is so both on average terms (see Table 1) as well as 
for the overwhelming majority of individual observations (85% of the total sample). The 
fairly small minority of observations for which ωt takes negative values are possibly due to 
unobserved factors specific to the market for electronic air-tickets for which we have no 
information.  
 
4.2. Econometric models and empirical results  
To examine the relationship between inter-domain deviations from the LOOP and 
nominal exchange rate uncertainty we estimate the following econometric model 
                                               
ttttt
ssE εααω +−+= +
2
121
)(                                                 (5) 
                                     st+1 = st + κt+1, with 01 =+ttE κ  and 
22
1 tttE θκ =+                                 (6) 
                     1
0 0
22
1 +−
= =
−+ +++= ∑ ∑ tit
k
i
n
i
iitit uuδκγβκ , with 01 =+ttuE  and
22
1 tttuE φ=+              (7)  
The underlying process driving st is taken to be a random walk
24
 described by (6). 
2
1 )( ttt ssE −+ captures the time-t expectation for the volatility of the exchange rate at time 
t+1, reflecting uncertainty about next period’s nominal exchange rate. This is modelled by (7) 
as a GARCH process where the ut-i terms denote moving average components. According to 
                                                 
24
 This hypothesis is well-supported by the data: Estimating a simple AR(1) model for the log of the nominal 
euro/GBP exchange rate over our sample period yields a first-order autoregressive coefficient exactly equal to 
unity.  
 13 
our analysis in section 3 the higher the uncertainty about next-period’s exchange rate the 
higher the value of tω . Consequently, we anticipate a positive sign for 2α .  
We estimate equation (5) using OLS and correct standard errors for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasiticity using Andrews’s (1991) correction.
25
 The results are reported in Table 
2, column (a). Consistent with our analysis in section 3 we obtain statistically significant 
positive coefficients for α2.26 Compared to the tω  series, applying the Granger and Teräsvirta 
(1993) general nonlinearity test on the estimated residuals of (5) reduces but does not 
eliminate evidence of nonlinear mean-reversion. This is consistent with condition (3) which 
allows for a nonlinear link between θ t2 (capturing 2tσ ) and tω  through the interaction of 
2
t
σ with the risk-aversion parameter r(Wf). Given the high frequency of our data, the high 
volatility of our dependent variable and possible nonlinearities, the data fit of the simple 
linear model given by equation (5) is satisfactory. Overall, the findings reported in Table 2 
combined with the near-perfect nature of the market to which they refer are consistent with 
the hypothesis that exchange rate uncertainty causes violations of the LOOP.  
We have tested the robustness of our findings in a number of ways. First, we added to 
the right-hand side of equation (5) the first lag of the dependent variable (see Table 2, column 
(b)). Second, we have added an intercept dummy variable (Dneg) taking the value of unity 
for negative observations of ωt, zero otherwise (Table 2, column (c)). Third, we have re-
estimated equation (5) setting the value of ωt and Et(st+1-st)2 equal to zero for negative 
observations of ωt (Table 2, column (d)).27 In all cases the term capturing exchange rate 
uncertainty remained positive and statistically significant. Finally, we repeated all estimations 
defining ωt and Et(st+1-st)2 respectively as the 30-day moving average of deviations from the 
                                                 
25
 The lag structure of the AR and MA components in equation (7) is determined by the Akaike information 
criterion. This suggested a GARCH (3,1) specification. The results are available upon request.  
26
 The statistical significance of α2 is robust to the correction of standard errors for non-normality using the wild 
bootstrap methodology (see e.g. Arghyrou and Gregoriou, 2007). The results are available upon request.  
27
 This is equivalent to eliminating all negative ωt observations from our estimation sample.  
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LOOP and the 30-day moving variance of the nominal exchange rate. The results (available 
upon request) remain unchanged.  
We conclude our empirical investigation by estimating a model allowing for non-
linear effects of exchange rate uncertainty on deviations from the LOOP, as suggested by the 
nonlinearity tests reported in Table 2. More specifically, we estimate the logistic smooth 
threshold autoregressive (LSTAR) model given by equations (6) to (9) below, where εt, u1t 
and u2t are white noise error terms:  
                                             ωt = α0 + qt ω1t + (1−qt) ω2t + εt                                        (8) 
                                          ω1t = α11 ωt-1  +α12 Et(st+1-st)2 + u1t                                                (9) 
                                         ω2t = α21 ωt-1 +α22 Et(st+1-st)2   + u2t                                     (10) 
                                         qt = pr { }δθτ −≥ t2ˆ = 1 - 
]ˆ[ 2
1
1
τθσ δ −− −+ te
                                           (11) 
Equation (8) models deviations from the LOOP on a constant and a weighted average 
of two regimes, a lower (ω1t) and an upper (ω2t) corresponding to periods of low and high 
exchange rate uncertainty respectively. The regime applying each period is determined 
according to whether the model’s transition variable 2ˆ δθ −t , a lagged value of the estimated 
exchange rate uncertainty obtain from equation (7), takes values below or above an 
endogenously determined threshold τ,  where δ  denotes the model’s delay parameter. The 
weight attached in equation (8) to the lower regime, qt, is modeled by the logistic function in 
equation (11) as the probability that 2ˆ δθ −t  takes values below τ, where the parameter σ  is the 
speed of transition between the two regimes.
28
 The estimates of the LSTAR model are 
presented in Table 2, column (e). In view of the nonlinearity tests reported in column (a), we 
                                                 
28
 In practice σ is usually estimated very imprecisely as the likelihood function in (7) is very insensitive to this 
parameter (see the detailed discussion on this point in van Dijk et al., 2002). 
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set δ =1 for Travelocity and δ =2 for Expedia.29 The reported equations confirm the presence 
of nonlinearities in the link between exchange rate uncertainty and deviations from the 
LOOP: In the lower regime, i.e. for values of 2ˆ δθ −t  below a small but well-defined critical 
threshold τ,  exchange rate uncertainty is not significant in explaining deviations from the 
LOOP. On the other hand, in the upper regime, to which approximately three quarters of all 
observations belong,
30
 the coefficient of exchange rate uncertainty is statistically significant 
and positive. This suggests that exchange rate uncertainty matters in explaining deviations 
from the law of one price as long as it is sufficiently high.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Market imperfections are the main explanation offered by the existing literature for 
permanent or highly persistent deviations from the law of one price (LOOP) and purchasing 
power parity (PPP) in the context of industrialised countries. We contribute to this literature 
in three distinct ways. First, we propose a new explanation for violations of the LOOP 
arguing that even in perfectly frictionless markets risk aversion driven by exchange rate 
uncertainty may cause a wedge between the domestic and foreign price of a totally 
homogeneous good. Second, we test our hypothesis on a unique micro-data set from a market 
with minimum imperfection. This provides a natural experiment from which the factors 
previously identified as the main potential causes of deviations from the LOOP are excluded. 
Finally, we validate our hypothesis empirically, as in the context of our near-perfect market 
accounting for exchange rate uncertainty we are able to explain a substantial proportion of 
deviations from the LOOP.  
                                                 
29
 The results reported in column (e) for Expedia remain unaffected when d is set equal to 1.  
30
 The estimated series of the conditional variance of the euro/GBP nominal exchange rate, determining to 
which regime each observation belongs, is available upon request.  
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Our analysis is too simple to be considered as an integrated theory of price setting 
under alternative exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, our natural experiment provides a 
powerful test of our hypothesis and suggests that co-existence of enormous exchange rate 
volatility and persistent deviations from the LOOP and PPP may not, after all, be as puzzling 
as suggested by Rogoff (1996). To the latter’s question (p. 647) as to how can one reconcile 
the enormous short-run volatility of real exchange rates with the extremely slow rate at which 
shocks [away from PPP] appear to damp out, our analysis suggests that deviations from PPP 
may be exactly due to enormous exchange rate volatility. This is consistent with the full 
range of previous empirical evidence on PPP which reject PPP for industrialised countries for 
floating but validates it for fixed exchange rates regimes. It also motivates further research on 
the role of exchange rate uncertainty in explaining deviations from PPP at the aggregate 
level.  
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Figure 2: Deviations from the law of one price for the market of online air-travel 
tickets  
 
(a) Travelocity.de to Travelocity.co.uk 
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(b) Expedia.de to Expedia.co.uk 
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Sample period: 1 April 2006 – 6 March 2009 (1071 daily observations)  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the market of online air-travel tickets   
    
  
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of 
variation  
    
Intra-domain comparisons     
Travelocity.co.uk/Expedia.co.uk 0.997 0.039 0.039 
Travelocity.de/Expedia.de 1.022 0.057 0.056 
    
Inter-domain comparisons     
Travelocity.de/Travelocity.co.uk 1.073 0.167 0.156 
Expedia.de/Expedia.co.uk 1.046 0.113 0.108 
    
 
Notes: Sample: 1 April 2006 – 6 March 2009 (1071 daily observations). The reported 
figures have been calculated using publicly available price quotations collected by the 
authors.  
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Table 2: Modelling deviations from the law of one price (ωt) for the market of online air-travel tickets  
 
       
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
      
      
Travelocity.de to Travelocity.co.uk    Lower regime Upper regime 
       
constant  .0.020 (0.001)** 0.013 (0.001)** 0.030 (0.002)** 0.022 (0.001)** 0.014 (0.002)** 
Et(st+1-st)
2 
1230 (180)** 777 (169)** 899 (152)** 1498 (151)** -1.368e-005  (955) 777 (198)** 
ωt-1  0.343 (0.025)**   0.396 (0.030)** 0.263 (0.042)** 
Dneg   -0.053 (0.003)**    
τ     3.62990e-006 (3.879e-007)** 
       
R
2 
0.45 0.53 0.61 0.54 0.53 
Nonlinearity test ωt 20.198** [1]      
Nonlinearity test εt 5.063** [1]      
       
Expedia.de to Expedia.co.uk      
       
constant  0.012 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.001)** 0.027 (0.001)** 0.017 (0.001)** 0.008 (0.002)** 
Et(st+1-st)
2 
819 (208)** 469 (172)** 305 (156)* 1075 (147)** -7.016e-006 (1220) 469 (199)* 
ωt-1  0.398 (0.025)**   0.435 (0.030)** 0.324 (0.046)** 
Dneg   -0.050 (0.002)**    
τ     3.159e-006 (2.980e-007)** 
       
R
2 
0.23 0.37 0.49 0.32 0.37 
Nonlinearity test ωt 6.848** [2]     
Nonlinearity test εt 4.035** [1]     
       
 
Notes: Estimation sample: 1 April 2006 – 6 March 2009 (1071 daily observations). *, ** denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. All equations have been 
estimated using intercept dummies capturing the effects of extreme outliers. For Travelocity, these are observations 116, 117, 118, 606, 974, 975 and 976; for Expedia observations 116, 117, 
118, 492, 607, 974 and 976. Standard errors in parentheses have been calculated using Andrews’s (1991) correction for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the 
reported coefficients is robust to the correction of standard errors for non-normality using the wild bootstrap methodology. Nonlinear adjustment is tested using the general nonlinearity test by 
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), testing the null hypothesis of linear mean reversion against the alternative of non-linear mean-reversion. The lag structure of the nonlinearity tests has been 
chosen using the series’ partial autocorrelation function (available upon request). Figures in square brackets denote the value of the delay parameter δ for which the nonlinearity test yields the 
strongest rejection of the null hypothesis of linear adjustment  
